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FOR THE BEST OR WORST INTERESTS OF BASEBALL:
THE COMMISSIONER'S POWERS LIE IN DOUBT
I. INTRODUCTION
So did they rid their rock of their tyrant, whom on the whole they
had liked very well. But everything has its day.'
The role of the Baseball Commissioner in managing Major League
baseball has been thrown into a state of uncertainty. The office is being
reassessed due to the culmination of events stemming from incidents
occurring in 1992. Specifically, Major League team owners challenged
Commissioner Fay Vincent, both formally and informally, causing him to
eventually resign from the office of Commissioner.2 Consequently, the
formerly broad, sweeping powers of the Commissioner's office are in grave
doubt.
3
The embattled Commissioner's problems did not arise overnight.
Indeed, Commissioner Vincent's entire three-year term was marked by both
calamity and controversy.4 Over that period of time he has encountered
more dilemmas than past baseball commissioners: the 1989 San Francisco
earthquake that interrupted the World Series, player controversies involving
Pete Rose's gambling and Steve Howe's continued drug abuse, shady
investigative maneuvers of New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner,
and the dispute over foreign investment in the business of baseball.5
However, none of these dilemmas affected the Commissioner's office as
profoundly as Vincent's decision to realign the Western and Eastern
1. WILLA CATHER, DEATH COMES FOR THE ARCHBISHOP 113 (Vintage Classics ed., 1990)
(1927) (The novel relates the fictional story of a Native American tribe which rises up against a
priest who, during his tenure in their parish, virtually enslaves them, while at the same time
enhancing their understanding of life. A parallel can be drawn to the power of the Baseball
Commissioner's office over Organized Baseball, the benefits the sport derives from that power,
and that sport's eventual frustration with the restrictions placed upon it by that power.).
2. Larry Whiteside, Vincent Quits As Baseball Chief, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 1992, Sports,
at 1.
3. See id.
4. Allen Barra, Fay's Way: In the Best Interests of the Game?, L.A. WEEKLY, Sept. 11, 1992,
at 31.
5. Id.
588 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol.13
Divisions of the National League.6  In so doing, Vincent unilaterally
overrode the National League Constitution by invoking the broad power
outlined in the Major League Agreement of 1921, allowing the Commis-
sioner to act "in the best interests of baseball."7
Acting under the auspices of this clause should not have been
alarming, as baseball commissioners have frequently resorted to this power
in a string of previous court cases.' In each prior instance, the judiciary
has protected, and sometimes even expanded, the "best interests" power.9
However, in the most recent challenge to that power, the unexpected
occurred: Judge Suzanne B. Conlon granted the Chicago Cubs, who
vehemently opposed league realignment, a temporary restraining order."0
This prevented Vincent from implementing his plans and effectively
obliterated the possibility of the leagues' realignment in time for the 1993
baseball season.
In implementing this decision, Judge Conlon seriously challenged the
long-held assumption that the Commissioner's powers are invulnerable."
Years of consistent behavior on the part of the Major League ball clubs,
coupled with favorable case law, had fostered the image that baseball
6. The owners of the National and American League ball clubs eventually voted to show their
lack of confidence in Fay Vincent as a Commissioner. Murray Chass, Owners, In An 18-9 Vote,
Ask Vincent To Resign, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1992, at B7. The vote was largely the result of
disfavor with Vincent's handling of the realignment situation, but other factors, such as Vincent's
perceived pro-player stance on labor issues and the manner in which the disciplinary hearings
against Steve Howe were administered, also played a part. The situation also resulted in the
owners taking affirmative steps to form a committee to restructure the Commissioner's office.
Id.
7. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club v. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033,
at *8-9 (N.D. Il. July 23, 1992) (vacated as moot on Sept. 24, 1992). When the Major League
Agreement was drafted, the "best interests" clause was not included; instead, the language allowed
the Commissioner to act only when he found an act or conduct to be "detrimental" to baseball.
The change to "best interests" occurred in 1964. Id. at *2-3.
8. See generally Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding
Baseball Commissioner may override an owner's sale of player contracts), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
876 (1978); Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(holding that Commissioner may suspend an owner from participation in ball club business as a
disciplinary measure); Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (holding
that Commissioner is authorized to disapprove an option contract of ball club assigning existing
agreement with player, but reserving right to recall).
9. Finley, 569 F.2d at 538. Here the court looked at the parties' respective understandings
of the clause in order to conclude that the action taken by the Commissioner was appropriate.
10. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club v. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033,
at *20.
11. Id. at * 13. The judge stated that "[u]nder Illinois rules for construing contracts, it is clear
that the broad authority granted the Commissioner ... is not as boundless as he suggests." Id.
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commissioners had absolute authority over the sport. 2 Now, one decision
has threatened that interpretation of the Commissioner's powers.
This Comment will interpret Judge Conlon's decision in Chicago
National League Ball Club v. Vincent 3 against a backdrop of modem
Major League baseball history.14 The Major League Agreement of 1921,
which granted the Baseball Commissioner the authority to investigate and
take remedial action against any "act," "transaction," or "practice" deemed
not in the best interests of baseball, figures prominently in that history.'
This Comment will also explore the ramifications the court decision and the
Commissioner's subsequent resignation from office will have in shaping the
scope of the office for future commissioners. 6
Though the Vincent case was later vacated,17 it ironically continues
to influence Major League baseball due to the disordered chain of events
that occurred in the wake of the decision. Taking advantage of the judicial
blow to Vincent, certain team owners took their own legally suspect
action." They convened prior to the end of Vincent's term of office to
vote on his ouster, 9 an action specifically prohibited by the Agreement.2 °
While Vimcent originally contested these actions, he eventually
relented, and, on September 8, 1992, resigned from his position, leaving the
coalition of hostile ball clubs free to restructure the powers of that
office.2 ' Vincent's resignation, however, had nothing to do with the
merits of the case;' instead, it was due to the rigors of the challenge on
12. Jeffrey A. Duney, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League Baseball's
Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581, 582 (1992).
13. No. 92-64398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033 (N.D. IM. July 23, 1992) (vacated as moot
on Sept. 24, 1992).
14. See infra parts II-IV.
15. HAROLD SEYMoUR, 2 BAsEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 322 (1971). The issue that arises
most consistently in each courtroom contest is the scope of the Commissioner's authority.
16. See infra notes 157-91 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
18. Chass, supra note 6, at B7.
19. Id.
20. Id. Technically, the subject matter of the vote was not his firing; it was actually a vote
of no-confidence. However, Vincent contended (and there is some factual support that indicated)
that even convening to discuss the possibility is contrary to the Agreement. Id
21. Whiteside, supra note 2, at 1.
22. In fact, at least one former federal district judge, Frank McGarr, who is now in private
practice and made the decisions in both the Finley and Atlanta Braves cases, opined prior to the
decision in the Vincent case that it appeared that Vincent had the authority to proceed with the
realignment, although he noted that Judge Conlon would have to make the actual decision. Judge
Gives Vincent Time To Reply, UPI, July 8, 1992 (BC Cycle), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
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the Commissioner, and his concern with how the lawsuit would affect the
office.' Upon his resignation, he candidly stated:
It would be an even greater disservice to baseball if I were to
precipitate a protracted fight over the office of the [C]ommiss-
ioner ... [a]fter the vote at the meeting last week, I can no
longer justify imposing on baseball, nor should baseball be
required to endure, a bitter legal battle.'
Furthermore, Judge Conlon vacated her decision solely because the
interim management committee rescinded Vincent's realignment order
following his resignation.' In her view, the issues involved are far from
moot and are bound to be relitigated at the appropriate time, perhaps as
soon as a new Commissioner is appointed and takes some kind of unilateral
action.' Because the court's decision said nothing regarding the owners'
legally suspect action, they have been left essentially unsupervised to devise
an organizational scheme for Major League baseball that will be drastically
different. Since the Commissioner's office has made no attempt to prevent
the team owners from reorganizing, the future remains uncertain.27
II. HISTORY OF THE BASEBALL COMMISSIONER OFFICE
A. The First Czar
From its inception, broad, far-reaching authority was vested in the
Baseball Commissioner's office. Judge Kenessaw Mountain Landis, the
first Commissioner of Baseball, arguably exerted the most control over the
sport.2
The events at the World Series in 1919 convinced the team owners
that an impartial power figure would be needed to administer the sport.
29
During the Series, which pitted the Chicago White Sox against the
Cincinnati Reds, it was discovered that at least seven members of the White
Sox had accepted bribes from well-known gambling magnates in exchange
23. Whiteside, supra note 2, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Telephone interview with Suzanne B. Conlon, Federal District Court Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois (Mar. 1, 1993).
26. Id.
27. Murray Chass, Baseball: Newly Empowered Owners Rescind Order To Reallign, N.Y.
TniEs, Sept. 25, 1992, at B9.
28. Barra, supra note 4, at 31.
29. SEYMOUR, supra note 15, at 310-11.
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for promising to deliberately lose the World Series to the Reds." Public
confidence in the game of baseball, already waning as a result of increased
gambling activities and duplicity on the part of players, stood to be
irreversibly shaken unless something was done to restore faith in the
game.' The vast majority of owners agreed the most expedient solution
was to hand over the disciplinary and business reigns to a financially
disinterested public figure who would act as an arbitrator." Judge Landis
quickly became the top contender for the position.32
Landis refused to accept the position unless the owners agreed that his
powers would extend to "control over whatever or whoever had to do with
baseball."33 In so doing, he ensured that his word would be accepted as
final in virtually every matter related to the sport. To comply with Landis'
ultimatum, the owners, in signing the Major League Agreement of 1921,
not only gave the Commissioner full power to investigate and take action
against any "act," "transaction," and "practice" deemed "detrimental to
baseball," but also contractually ceded their right to bring lawsuits against
the Commissioner questioning his judgment.'
Consequently, Commissioner Landis was sufficiently empowered to
take quick, comprehensive action against the offenders involved in what
had come to be known as the "Black Sox" scandal.3 After taking office,
he banned the seven White Sox players who had been accused of accepting
bribes, as well as an eighth player who apparently had knowledge of his
teammates' duplicity. 6 Owners and players were comfortable with the
precedent, and Landis, in the course of his twenty-three year tenure,
proceeded to expel more players and other parties than any succeeding
commissioner.37 He had clearly established a comprehensive framework
for the authority of the Commissioner's office. Some commentators even
referred to Landis as the "czar" of Organized Baseball.3"
30. Id. at 301.
30. Il at 310.
31. Id at 311.
32. Id. at 314. Judge Landis' favorable treatment of organized baseball in an antitrust suit
originating in his court was the principal reason for his placement on the list of possible
appointees to the office being contemplated by the owners. Id. at 312.
33. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 876 (1978).
34. SEYMOuR, supra note 15, at 322.
35. Id at 330.
36. Id.
37. DAVID L. PORTER, BIOGRAPICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SPORTS: BASEBALL 324
(1987).
38. SEYMOuR, supra note 15, at 323.
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B. The First Challenge
In 1931, the authority of the Commissioner's office was contested for
the first time in Milwaukee American Ass'n. v. Landis.39 At the time, the
baseball code required each Major League club to give the other clubs the
option to "waive or refuse to waive" on a player before executing an
unconditional release of a player.' A caveat permitted Major League
teams to assign players to Minor League teams on optional agreements"
if done within two years of the original contracting between the Major
League Club and the player.42
The owner of the St. Louis Cardinals acquired controlling interests in
several Minor League clubs, then transferred a player between those clubs
to avoid the scrutiny of the other Major League teams.43 The suit arose
after the Commissioner's investigation revealed that these transfers were
occurring beyond the two-year time frame, leading him to find them
violative of the waiver provision of the baseball code.'
The dispute was resolved in Landis' favor.45 The court held that the
Major League Agreement of 1921 endowed the Commissioner with broad
power to arbitrate controversies and secure parties' compliance with the
rules of baseball.46 The court went further, however, finding the provi-
sions of the Agreement are "so unlimited in character that we can conclude
only that the parties did not intend so to limit the meaning of conduct
detrimental to baseball, but intended to vest in the [C]ommissioner
jurisdiction to prevent any conduct destructive of the aims of the code."47
The court's opinion even concluded that it was the clear intent of the
Agreement's drafters "to endow the [C]ommissioner with all the attributes
of a benevolent but absolute despot and all the disciplinary powers of the
39. 49 F. Supp.. 298 (N.D. 111. 1931).
40. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F. Supp. 298, 302 (N.D. m. 1931). By waiving or
refusing to do so, the management of each team had the opportunity to indicate interest in
negotiating with a particular player. If no teams took advantage of this opportunity, that player
could be traded to the minor leagues. lId
41. An optional agreement allowed a Major League team to recall a player from a Minor
League club assignment at will. Id. at 301.
42. Id
43. Id. at 300, 302.
44. Id. at 300.
45. Landis, 49 F. Supp. at 304.
46. Id. at 301.
47. Id at 302 (emphasis added).
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proverbial paterfamilias."'  In so doing, the court validated the scope of
the Commissioner's power as contemplated by the architects of that
position, the team owners. The move to create such a powerful figure was
unprecedented in any commercial industry, but the court chose not to
second-guess the intent of the Agreement's framers.4 9 Although the
owners' relinquishment of authority is traceable to their desperate desire to
salvage the baseball business, their intent to relinquish the reigns of the
baseball business to one man was clear. °
C. Restraints and Restoration
Judge Landis' liberal powers surely made him an infamous figure
during his tenure and allowed him to shape much of what constitutes
modem-day baseball business practices.5' However, his extensive power
was not conferred on his immediate successor.52  At the end of Landis'.
tenure in 1944, the team owners of both leagues convened to exercise their
rights under the Major League Agreement to reformulate the powers of
commissioners. 3 They struck the provision in the Agreement which
precluded recourse against the Commissioner in the courts, and excised the
broad power to remedy matters "detrimental" to baseball.'
As a result of these changes, subsequent commissioners A.B. "Happy"
Chandler and Ford Frick played significantly reduced roles in the business
48. Il at 299 (emphasis added). A paterfamilias, in Roman law, was the head or master of
the family. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1126 (6th ed. 1990). Such an authority invests in its
possessor the ultimate power and "dominion" over the "family." Id.
49. Seymour notes that Judge Landis became the first "industry doctor." SEYMOUR, supra
note 15, at 323. However, the position sparked interest in industry czars and led to the creation
of similar positions in other entertainment fields, including the Academy of Motion Picture Arts
and Sciences. Id.
50. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *2.
51. SEYMOUR, supra note 15, at 367. See also Daniel Okrent, On the Money, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 10, 1989, at 41.
52. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *2.
53. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d. 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 876 (1978) (citing the Major League Agreement, Art. IV, § 2 (1975)). The league owners,
in their adoption of the Major League Agreement of 1921, bound themselves to a provision that
barred any alterations to the scope of a Commissioner's authority while that Commissioner was
serving his term. Only at intervals between terms of office could alterations be made. Id. The
owners ignored this provision in the Vincent situation, taking a vote of no confidence with the
intent that it be binding, well before the Commissioner's term was to expire. Chass, supra note
6, at B7.
54. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *3.
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of baseball, to the sport's detriment.55 Because Frick would not take an
aggressive stance, the sport became heavily administered by the owners.
This resulted in player unionization, minor league instability, and Congres-
sional subcommittees forming to investigate organized baseball's possible
violations of federal antitrust laws.56 Frick finally realized that in order
to ensure the sport's entertainment image, commissioners must be able to
act in response to matters detrimental to baseball. Upon his retirement in
1964, Frick requested that the league owners consider amending the Major
League Agreement to again strengthen the office of the Commissioner.57
Consequently, the Commissioner's powers were restored to the stature
they enjoyed during the Landis era.58 Not only was the provision denying
owners recourse in the courts reinstated, but the Commissioner's power was
strengthened by another language modification in the Agreement.59 The
phrase bestowing on the Commissioner the authority to affirmatively
challenge acts or practices "detrimental to the best interests of baseball"
was altered to allow the Commissioner the ability to act where a practice
is "not in the best interests of baseball."'  This was a substantive change
from the previous language, allowing broader interpretation by the
Commissioner, and failing to bind him to any objective definition of what
constitutes the "best interests" of baseball.6'
D. Second Round of Challenges
Despite these decisive modifications, the intermittent years of relaxed
oversight left the scope of the Commissioner's authority exposed to
challenge. Twice, in the late 1970's, during Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's
term, the owners of Major League ball clubs took issue with the Commis-
sioner's power to take punitive and remedial action against them.62
55. DAVID QUENTIN VoIGHT, 3 AMERICAN BASEBALL: FROM PosTwAR ExPANSION To THE
ELECTRONIC AGE 93-95 (1983).
56. Id. at 95.
57. Id. at 96.
58. Finley, 569 F.2d at 534.
59. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *2.
60. Id.
61. Finley, 569 F.2d at 539.
62. See generally Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978); Atlanta
Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
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1. Finley v. Kuhn
In Finley v. Kuhn,63 the court held that Kuhn was acting within his
powers as Commissioner in voiding the Oakland club's sale of three player
contracts." Charles Finley, owner of the Oakland Athletics, had orches-
trated the sale of Oakland's contract rights to players Joe Rudi, Rollie
Fingers, and Vida Blue to other teams for a total of $3.5 million just prior
to the June 15, 1976 trading deadline. 5 This transaction was significant
because, had the trading deadline passed, Finley would have had to offer
the contracts to all American League clubs, beginning with the lowest-
ranked, at the sum of $20,000 each.6
Commissioner Kuhn responded by nullifying the transactions, noting
that the contract sales signified a disturbing trend: financially stable ball
clubs buying talent at sums prohibitive to other teams in the place of
developing their own talent through "traditional and sound methods of
player development and acquisition." 67  Kuhn found that wholesale
purchasing of prime talent was not in the best interests of baseball, and
would undermine some teams while shortchanging the American public."
The court held that Commissioner Kuhn did not act arbitrarily or capri-
ciously in finding that these activities were not in the best interests of
baseball, and that he was well within his powers under the Major League
Agreement in nullifying the sale of players' contracts. 9 The court passed
on the opportunity to second-guess the Commissioner's decision, noting
that the only applicable standard is what the Commissioner felt would best
protect baseball.7 ' Absent malicious, arbitrary, or capricious behavior on
the part of the Commissioner, which both that court and others had been
63. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
64. Id. at 537.
65. Id. at 531.
66. Id.
67. BowIE KUHN, HARDBALL: THE EDUCATION OF A BASEBALL COMMISSIONER 178 (1987).
68. Id.
69. Finley, 569 F.2d at 539.
70. Id. at 538. If the courts had meant to interpret that baseball had vested more limited
authority in the Commissioner, they could have chosen to apply a stricter standard to that office.
For example, the courts could have applied a reasonable person standard or a standard for persons
entrusted to be custodians of another's business. Some critics have argued for the application of
these standards. See Matthew B. Pachman, Limits On the Discretionary Powers of Professional
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised By the Pete Rose
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1427 (1990).
19.31
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reluctant to find, the end of the line for players' contract decisions was with
the Commissioner, not with individual team owners.7"
2. Atlanta National League Ball Club v. Kuhn
The broad reading of the Commissioner's authority in Finley was
largely upheld in Atlanta National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn (Atlanta
Braves).2 In Atlanta Braves, the Commissioner promulgated policies to
facilitate negotiations between teams and players when players become free
agents." The guidelines designated time frames during which negotiations
could occur, and prohibited ball clubs from making public statements that
would imply they were interested in signing particular players.74 In
violation of the guidelines, the Atlanta ball club initiated negotiations with
player Gary Matthews prior to the end of his option year with the San
Francisco Giants.75 In addition, Ted Turner, chief executive officer for the
Atlanta ball club, made a statement at a cocktail party in New York
indicating interest in Matthews, which was carried in San Francisco
newspapers.76  Because of these violations, the court held that the
Commissioner acted within his authority in mandating that Ted Turner be
banned from baseball for one year.7
The court did not similarly uphold Kuhn's decision to deprive the
Atlanta Braves of their first-round draft choice in the June 1977 amateur
draft, finding that language in the Major League Agreement justified the
disparate treatment." The court followed the general rule that specific
language in a contract should supersede generalized language. 9 Since the
Major League Agreement specified several punitive measures in Article I,
Section 3 that may be invoked against violators, those measures were
deemed to be exhaustive rather than expansive.80 The courts have not
71. Finley, 569 F.2d at 538.
72. 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977) [hereinafter Atlanta Braves].
73. Id. at 1215. "Free agents" are players who, having completed the specified term of their
contract and having played (at their team's option) for one additional year, may negotiate with
other teams for a playing contract. Id.
74. Id. at 1216.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1217.
77. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1225 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
78. Id. at 1226.
79. Id. at 1224. See also Charles 0. Finley & Co v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527,535 (7th Cir. 1978).
80. Atlanta Braves, 432 F. Supp. at 1225 (citing the Major League Agreement, Art. I, § 3
(1975)).
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similarly limited the meaning of the "remedial" and "preventive" powers
of the Commissioner, holding that those powers can be invoked notwith-
standing the violation of a Major League rule or an action involving moral
turpitude." While the court established that contractual modifications can
affect the scope of a Commissioner's authority, it was hardly a wholesale
intrusion into the Commissioner's powers, and if anything, limited only the
Commissioner's punitive authority.' Therefore, it follows that because
the Commissioner's remedial and preventive authority could not be limited
in the Atlanta Braves case, at the time the Vincent case arose that authority
should have stood particularly secure.
The Atlanta Braves court also pointed out that ball club owners were
largely responsible for the authority vested in their Commissioner; the ball
clubs' past unwillingness to modify contractual language in the Agreement
inferred desire, or at least acquiescence, in being bound by whatever
decisions the Commissioner made, even if they appeared arbitrary.83 This
acquiescence, coupled with the behavior of subsequent commissioners,
firmly established that the powers associated with the Commissioner's
office are largely unbridled."
E. The Extent of the Commissioner's Power
1. Baseball's Own Perspective On Its Commissioner's Powers
While a particular player or team owner may occasionally cry foul
over a Commissioner's policy which negatively impacts him, Major League
baseball, as a whole, has largely supported recent commissioners and their
decisions.85 Many have even been lauded. Peter Ueberroth, who served
as Commissioner from 1984-1988, overruled a league vote in 1985 in order
81. Finley, 569 F.2d at 539. In the Atlanta Braves case, the Commissioner argued that the
denial of the first-round draft choice had a remedial element. While the court readily admitted
that it is difficult to draw lines as to what falls within these distinct enumerated powers, it
endeavored to do so nevertheless. The court held that a line had to be drawn between the types
of actions, and that since the San Francisco club received no benefit (which would be one of the
underlying aims of a remedial action), the action taken by the Commissioner was more punitive
than remedial in nature. Atlanta Braves, 432 F. Supp. at 1225-26.
82. See Atlanta Braves, 432 F. Supp. at 1225 (citing American League Baseball Club v.
Johnson, 179 N.Y.S. 498, 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919)).
83. Id. at 1222.
84. See Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
85. Murray Chass, If Vincent's An Autocrat, the Owners Are To Blame, N.Y. TfMEs, July 9,
1992, at B14.
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to allow broadcasting mogul Edward Gaylord to obtain a minority
ownership interest in the Texas Rangers. 86 Although this action was not
specifically within the scope of his powers under the Major League
Agreement, he encountered none of the legal challenges which Vincent later
faced.
Despite intermittent opposition based primarily on the interests of a
few individuals, owners have continued to respect the role of the Commis-
sioner and have tended to uphold a broad interpretation of the powers of
that office.8 Such acceptance may stem from the fact that the creation of
the Commissioner's role saved baseball economically in 1921 and arguably
continues to benefit it. 9 Acceptance of the Commissioner's vast powers
has since become viewed as one of the integral features of the sport.'
Even those viewing the Commissioner's authority most conservatively have
called it expansive.9
2. Powers In Relation To Other Professional Sports Commissioners
It has long been posited that the powers of baseball commissioners are
extremely malleable in comparison with those of other professional sports
commissioners.' The National Football League's Constitution and
Bylaws lay out a seven page framework regarding the authority of the NFL
Commissioner and place more concrete standards on that office's handling
of disciplinary and business matters.93 Furthermore, baseball is the only
professional sport to enjoy exemption from federal antitrust laws, largely
86. Owners Overruled One Month After American League Owners Rejected the Transaction,
Commissioner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1985, § 1, at 28.
87. Hal Bodley, The Ueberroth Years, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 29, 1989, at 1C.
88. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 1978). In Finley, 21 of
25 signatories to the Major League Agreement testified as to their understanding of the
Agreement, and the testimony was consistent with sweeping powers being vested in the
Commissioner's office. Il
89. SEYMOUR, supra note 15, at 343, 367. The owners benefitted economically in that by
having a neutral party in control, public confidence in the fairness of the sport was aided. As a
result, the public is seemingly more at ease investing money in the sport as a mode of
entertainment. In addition, the role protects baseball from outside influences such as the federal
government. See infra notes 170-86 and accompanying text. See also Jerome Holtzman, et al.,
In Cost Squeeze, Baseball Charting the Unknown, Cm. TRiB., Oct. 4, 1992, at IC.
90. Holtzman, supra note 89, at 1C.
91. Chass, supra note 85, at B14.
92. See Pachman, supra note 70, at 1417-18.
93. la, See also the NAIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONSTrUTION AND BYLAWS.
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because of the perception that the independence of the Commissioner's
office keeps team owners from monopolizing the industry.'4
3. The View of the Courts
Some commentators have contended that the Commissioner's powers,
as a settled point of law, are virtually limitless.95 Though the court in
Atlanta Braves denied the Commissioner the authority to strip a baseball
team of its first-round draft choice, it preserved its analysis of the office's
power by asserting that there is little the Commissioner cannot do unless
his actions substantially interfere with the rights of individual players."
Indeed, at least in a general respect, the Commissioner's decision did affect
individual players because they would lose the opportunity to play for the
Braves.
However, the recent treatment of the issue by Judge Conlon in
Chicago National League Ball Club v. Vincent 7 suggests that, at least in
that court's view, there may actually be a great deal the Commissioner
cannot do. The decision, as this Comment will demonstrate, implies that
future challenges could easily succeed if alternative language in either the
Major League Agreement, the constitutions of the leagues, or the rules of
baseball, would arguably advance a prospective plaintiff's position.98 The
decision abandons the view that the. Commissioner is only barred from
decisions affecting individual players, and paves the way for attacks by ball
club organizations and corporations affiliated with them.
94. Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional Baseball's
Exemption From the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. PIrr. L. REV. 209, 209 (1983). In fact, the particular
power structure of organized baseball is so integral to the exemption that now the Senate is in the
throws of deciding whether or not it should be continued in light of recent events. Alison
Muscatine, Baseball, Congress Not Exempt From Conflict, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1993, at D2.
95. Dumey, supra note 12, at 581.
96. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1225 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
97. No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1992) (vacated as moot
Sept. 24, 1992).
98. laU at *17.
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I. CHICAGO NAT'L LEAGUE BALL CLUB V. VINCENT
A. Prelude-Labor Relations
Although the power of the Commissioner's office survived several
serious challenges in the past and emerged virtually unscathed, Major
League baseball is not above the dictates of change. By the spring of 1992,
a coalition was formed by a group of owners who viewed the Commis-
sioner's unlimited power as an untenable feature in a modem baseball
market." Commissioner Vincent was approached by several of these
owners, who requested that he relinquish his broad powers over the sport
with respect to the realm of labor relations."° The owners were worried
that Vincent would not support their hardline positions and would intervene
in labor negotiations to the benefit of the Major League Players' Associa-
tion.
10
The Commissioner refused to relinquish any power, relying on his
legal rights under the Major League Agreement." 2 This action frustrated
those who had developed the relinquishment proposal,"°3 and furthered a
growing view among various ball club owners that the Commissioner was
not adequately representing their interests."°
B. The Mariners Fiasco
Friction mounted as a group representing a Japanese investor
formulated a plan to purchase the Seattle Mariners. 5 There was substan-
tial support by the National League for this transaction from the outset, due
to the distressed financial condition of the Mariners; Vincent, however, was
not impressed with the business opportunity as it was originally pro-
posed.'06
Vincent noted that while the transaction may temporarily avert
continued financial turmoil for the Seattle Mariners, approval of the deal
99. Murray Chass, Vincent Repels Move To Cut His Powers On Labor, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
1992, at B9.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Chass, supra note 99, at B9.
105. Owners To Consider Mariners Sale, UPI (BC Cycle), Apr. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
106. Id.
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would cut against the baseball's policy against foreign investment.1" He
reminded owners that the policy had been maintained in the interests of
running the baseball business smoothly, surmising that off-shore investment
could open a Pandora's box of new legal dilemmas for the sport." 8
Much of the response to Vincent was less than flattering. He was even
called "xenophobic" and "racist' by some sportswriters. 9
A compromise was finally developed that allowed a sale to investor
Hiroshi Yamauchi, conditioned on his preclusion from obtaining a
controlling interest in the team."' This eliminated some of the legal
worries raised by Vincent and, at the same time, ensured that the Mariners
would remain in Seattle."' However, once again, Vincent had shown
that he was perfectly comfortable intervening in the business matters of the
ball club owners, as much in acquisition transactions as in matters involving
the Player's Association.
C. Realignment Friction
The issue of the National League's proposed realignment created
further difficulties. Commissioner Vincent had long professed that he was
uncomfortable with the geographic imbalance that had existed in the
National League since the inception of divisional play in 1969.2 The
clubs had been seeking realignment prior to the onset of the 1993 baseball
season, and met to vote on the issue just as the 1992 season was begin-
ning113
The realignment proposition was approved by a substantial majori-
ty.14 Only two of the existing twelve clubs opposed the realignment.1
However, according to the letter of the National League Constitution, the
measure could not proceed despite such widespread approval." 6 Specifi-
107. Bill Brubaker, The Head of the Game, Faced With Trouble, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1992,
at D1. It should be clarified that Vincent was using "foreign" in the context of investors from
outside North America. The National Baseball League has included teams from Canada since its
inception, so Canadian investment would not give rise to the "foreign" issue.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Chass, supra note 99, at B9.
111. Id
112. Ross Newhan, Vincent Orders A Realignment ofNL, L.A. TIMEs, July 7, 1992, at Cl.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id
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cally, one of the provisions of the National League Constitution states that
no realignment proposal may be implemented without at least a three-
fourths majority vote, and that no team may be moved without its
consent." 7 This provision was problematic since the Chicago Cubs, who
would be transferred to the Western Division along with the St. Louis
Cardinals under the realignment scheme, was one of the clubs which
vehemently opposed the move."8
Concerned that the Cubs were singlehandedly thwarting a plan
approved by the vast majority, a coalition of team owners requested the
Commissioner to intervene." 9 Bill White, President of the National
League, received word of the developing coalition and the Commissioner's
consternation over the problem. 20 White issued a statement to Vincent
on June 8, 1992, which strongly urged Vincent to abstain from involvement
in the realignment issue. 2' White felt that while the Commissioner may
feel strongly about the issue, challenging the Cubs would do irreparable
damage to baseball. In retrospect, he was evidently correct.
Nevertheless, on July 3, 1992, Vincent announced that he was going
to approve the realignment over the Cubs' objection because it was "in the
best interests of baseball."'" It proved to be a decision he would later
regret. The Cubs responded by commencing promised litigation."n On
July 7, they filed a motion for a preliminary restraining order to prevent the
realignment mandated by Vincent, on the grounds that he lacked the
authority to unilaterally abrogate the National League Constitution.'24
The Cubs' request for an immediate injunction was rebuffed."n
District Judge Conlon allowed the Commissioner adequate time to respond
to the motion before making a ruling. 6 On July 23, however, after
Vincent's attorneys had complied, Judge Conlon granted the injunction,
holding that the Cubs would likely prevail on the merits of the case and
117. Newhan, supra note 112, at Cl.
118. Murray Chass, 4 Teams To Change Divisions As Baseball's Map Is Redrawn, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 7, 1992, at Al.
119. lId
120. See id.
121. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *4-5.
122. Newhan, supra note 112, at Cl.
123. Larry Whiteside, Cubs File Suit To Stay Put, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 1992, at 69.
124. Ross Newhan, Vincent Sued By Cubs To Halt Realignment, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1992,
at Cl.
125. Judge Gives Vincent Time to Reply, UPI (BC Cycle), July 8, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
126. lId
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that by not issuing the injunction irreparable harm would be visited upon
the team. 7
Judge Conlon found that the Cubs had a compelling interest in
fostering and maintaining the traditional rivalries which had naturally
developed over the years of playing baseball in the Eastern Division."
The Cubs successfully argued that by not remaining in their particular
division and continuing to play a similar number of games against their
usual opponents, the traditional rivalries would be threatened and spectator
interest in the team would be impaired. 29 The judge felt that sparing the
team, the league, and the public the possibility of a change in the Cubs'
routine was enough to justify abrogating Vimcent's realignment order.130
IV. EFFECT OF THE COURT'S DEcIsIoN
A. Changes In the Management of the Sport
In Vincent,3 1 the court reasoned that where there are specific
provisions for the resolution of problems in baseball's bylaws, the Baseball
Commissioner's powers must be read in light of those provisions. 32 In
this particular case, the district court found that the Commissioner's powers
in realigning the National League were very limited, given that the National
League Constitution (NLC) expressed a specific avenue for resolving issues
of realignment. 3 3 The court reasoned that since the NLC addressed the
issue, there was no other avenue available to achieve realignment." 4 In
fact, the court stated that the Commissioner must be precluded from
affecting the process, because for him to do so would compromise the
rights of a particular ball club which had used anti-majoritarian protections
of the league's constitution to save itself from the perceived evils of
realignment.
135
127. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *17-18.
128. Id. at *19.
129. Id.
130. Il
131. No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033.
132. Id. at *17 (citing Major League Agreement, Art. VII (1975)). The provisions Judge
Conlon refered to included both Article VII of the Major League Agreement and from
supplementary provisions as well. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *16-17.
135. Id. at *17.
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The court's treatment of the issue was not completely novel, but rather
one which had been largely ignored in the past. The court in Atlanta
Braves, for example, used the language of the Major League Agreement
itself, which set out specific punitive powers endowed to the Commissioner,
as a proclamation of the extent of his punitive authority.'36
In Vincent, by contrast, the court juxtaposed the language of a broad
provision in the Major League Agreement with a provision found in the
NLC."' Judge Conlon reasoned that the Baseball Commissioner's far-
reaching prerogatives are limited when pitted against the constitutions of
the individual major leagues.'38 The court stated that business manage-
ment and practices which are specifically governed by the NLC should be
impervious to attack.'39 The basis of the reasoning was also located in
the NLC, where it states that the Commissioner may settle any disputes
"other than those whose resolution is expressly provided for by another
means in... the [Major League] constitution."'"
On the surface, it may appear Judge Conlon made a logical determina-
tion. Holding otherwise would seemingly authorize future baseball
commissioners to unilaterally abrogate the National League Constitution
and any other documents that they believe compromise their broad "best
interests" powers. If baseball commissioners found many acts, transactions,
and practices not in the best interests of baseball, a growing number of
team owners may suddenly find their contractual rights inhibited.
Judge Conlon was clearly apprehensive about such possibilities, and
developed a classification to prevent such occurrences in future cases. She
ruled that a realignment vote could not come within the purview of "an act,
transaction, or practice" as defined in the Major League Agreement.
141
Instead, Conlon's opinion drew a distinction between questionable conduct
subject to the Commissioner's judgments and contractual rights held by
individual club owners.142 Contractual rights, according to Conlon, could
not be equated with "conduct [or misconduct] for the Commissioner to
investigate, punish, or remedy."'43  Instead, contractual rights are a
136. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1225 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(citing Major League Agreement, Art. I, § 3 (1975)).
137. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *13-14.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *13.
140. Id. at *16.
141. Id. at *14.
142. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *14.
143. Id.
AUTHOR1TY OF THE BASEBALL COMMISSIONER
standard element of business decision-making and therefore may stand up
against the Commissioner's authority."4
B. Short-Sighted Consideration
1. Possibility of Waiver
Despite the court's plausible reasoning, the judge discounted the
dynamics of the Commissioner's relationship to the Major League team
owners. In 1976, Commissioner Kuhn proceeded to overturn the National
League's rejection of Major League expansion. 45 As already mentioned,
Peter Ueberroth acted in a similar fashion by approving minority ownership
of the Texas Rangers in 1985."4 Judge Conlon found that previous
instances of deference to past commissioners failed to warrant deference in
this situation. 47 She distinguished prior incidents on the grounds that
"[tihese incidents did not arise under comparable factual circumstances and
implicated different constitutional provisions. ' 48
However, by finding that these past acquiescences had inconsequential
evidentiary value, the court precluded itself from exploring the possibility
that the Commissioner's powers may now extend beyond the letter of the
Major League Agreement.149 Consequently, the court overlooked the very
real possibility that these past acquiesences may have in fact constituted
waivers of clubs' contractual rights. 5
A waiver of a contractual right may occur where parties have elected
to "dispense with something of value or to forgo some advantage which
one might, at his option, have demanded.1 .1 To be effective as a waiver,
the party or parties who are relinquishing rights must have knowledge or
awareness that they are about to do so.'" Clearly, in the countless
interferences by previous baseball commissioners, team owners could have
then asserted that those commissioners were overstepping their bounds.
144. Id. at *17.
145. Id at *16.
146. Sports People: Owners Overruled One Month After American League Owners Rejected
the Transaction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1985, § 1, at 28.
147. Vincent, No. 92-C4398, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11033, at *14.
148. Id at *16.
149. Id
150. Chass, supra note 118, at Al.
151. BALLENTINE's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1356 (3d ed. 1969).
152. Id.
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Under the Major League Agreement, the owners had the option, at the
end of any Commissioner's term, to prevent subsequent commissioners
from taking undesired actions by amending either the Major League
Agreement or one of the league constitutions.'53 At times they have
taken advantage of this option. On the whole, however, instead of making
changes or remedying areas of conflict, the owners have left the playing
field of the Major League baseball business intact.
The Atlanta Braves court even indicated that the encouragement or
approval by league members for action taken by the Commissioner may
create a prima facie case for the validity of such action."5 Where teams
or owners have in the past applauded the actions taken by commissioners,
this approval can be used to show that they understood this power was
within the Commissioner's realm. 55 In fact, in the Finley case, the judge
specifically noted the plaintiff's past approval of the Commissioner's broad
and unfettered powers.'56
By ignoring the rights the owners had available to them, Judge Conlon
may be attaching unwarranted importance to the provision of the National
League Constitution which allows any team to unilaterally block a proposed
league realignment because its interests would be affected. Perhaps a point
exists where the interests of individual teams, while obviously protected
from majoritarian influence, must yield to the Baseball Commissioner's
rationale for what constitutes the "best interests of baseball." Such an
analysis may serve as a more fitting protection where the overriding goal
in protecting teams in the first place is to promote fairness. Now, with the
case vacated, the team owners will be able to restructure the position and
effectively change the terms of their contract by unilateral action.
2. Failure To Recognize the Real Interests
The Vincent court failed to properly evaluate the issues because it did
not recognize the actual basis of the conflict between the parties involved.
Had it done so, it would have reached a result which would have squared
better with what the framers of both the Major League Agreement and the
league constitutions must have intended when they entered into those
agreements.
153. Chass, supra note 85, at B14.
154. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1221 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
155. Il
156. Charles 0. Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527,537-38 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
876 (1978).
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While the Cubs argued that it was traditional team rivalries which
would be disadvantaged by failure to decide in their favor,"s this was
not, in reality, their most pressing concern. Actually, the potential loss of
cable television revenues was the most fundamental issue. 5 The Cubs
are owned by the Tribune Company, which, in addition to owning
Chicago's major newspaper, controls the cable superstation which
broadcasts the team's games.'59 Estimates revealed that ratings losses
would be incurred due to the Cubs playing Western Division teams.6"
The starting game times for Western Division teams would be later, and the
potential viewing audience in Chicago would be diminished.161 This loss
has nothing to do with the game of baseball itself, but instead affects a
business owned by a private entity that relies on Major League baseball to
create a demand for its product.
In the 1970's cases involving Commissioner Kuhn, one of the
underlying reasons the Commissioner prevailed was that he clearly
articulated the actions he took were done to protect the integrity of the
game and the trust and expectations of the American public. 62 While
allowing the sale of player contracts would have benefitted the Oakland
Athletics, the rest of baseball stood to lose. The long-term interest of the
public would have been stifled since only wealthy teams-not those
utilizing strategy and skill to win-would stand to dominate the indus-
try.
163
It follows that if the cable television industry, rather than the sport's
organizers, influence how the sport is played, the "national pastime" image
that baseball has managed to preserve for so long could conceivably be
frustrated. Over the course of seventy years, the sport has thrived, in part
due to its ability to downplay its status as a multi-million dollar business
and package itself in a way that appeals to the public's notions of goodwill,
fairness, and being American. 6 Fans are bound to be disappointed, and
the public generally disconcerted, by the fact that the National League
157. Murray Chass, Cubs, In Court, Get Reprieve From Realignment, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
1992, at B9.
158. Newhan, supra note 112, at C1.
159. lI
160. I.
161. I.
162. Finley, 569 F.2d at 537.
163. Id
164. See CHARLES C. ALEXANDER, OUR-GAME: AN AMERICAN BASEBALL HISTORY 129,266
(1991).
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Constitution is being used to facilitate the cable television industry rather
than the sport itself.
The Atlanta Braves court was willing to read the Commissioner's
powers very broadly to ensure that baseball's image was preserved; Judge
Conlon failed to follow that precedent any further, instead restricting those
powers so tightly that the "gloss" provided by the intent of baseball's
bylaws will be of lessened importance. She opted to strictly interpret the
provisions, resulting in the dismantling of the sport's power structure.
Judge Conlon interpreted a fragment of the Atlanta Braves case, which
limited the Commissioner's punitive powers to those enumerated, as an
underpinning for her position. In reality, however, while the punitive
powers were more clearly defined in Atlanta Braves, the preventative and
remedial powers were arguably strengthened."6  In that case it was
admitted that those provisions are not as tangible as the punitive measures,
especially for an outside arbitrator unfamiliar with the aims of the baseball
code.166
Judge Conlon viewed other provisions within the baseball bylaws as
contractual rights and beyond the scope of the code. 67 However, in
Landis, the court's opinion is clear that the judiciary should not draw such
lines. The court said that the language of the baseball code "expressly
provided that nothing contained in the code shall be construed as exclusive-
ly defining or otherwise limiting acts, practices, or conduct detrimental to
baseball.
168
The Landis court also stated that anything destructive of the code's
aims could conceivably be viewed as detrimental conduct. 69 In fact, the
Commissioner was seen as having a "necessary and proper" line of power
to uphold the "morale of the players and the honor of the game." This
second reference to the honor of the game is particularly interesting when
pitted against the case at hand. The honor of the game is exactly what will
suffer if the interests of the cable television industry are placed before those
of baseball. The underlying purpose in appointing a Baseball Commis-
sioner was to vest in him jurisdiction to assure "the integrity of the game
165. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
166. Finley, 569 F.2d at 537. The court used the wide aims of the baseball code as another
argument for applying judicial restraint in the matter. The court stated: "Standards such as the
best interests of baseball, the interests of the morale of the players and the honor of the game, or
'sportsmanship which accepts the umpire's decision without complaint,' are not necessarily
familiar to the courts and obviously require some expertise in their application." Id.
167. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
168. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F. Supp. 298, 302 (N.D. I1. 1931).
169. I&
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and the maintenance of public confidence in it."'7 ° This aim-preserving
the national pastime image of Major League baseball-would inevitably be
tarnished.
C. Repercussions: Possible Loss of Antitrust Exemption
In the wake of Judge Conlon's decision, eighteen of the twenty-seven
Major League club owners felt sufficiently empowered to request Fay
Vincent's resignation, a request with which he eventually complied."'
The owners have since utilized the historic opportunity to analyze the role
of the office and retool it for the modem era. 72 The results of that
undertaking stand to damage organized baseball as it is now conceived,
unless done carefully and with an eye toward the consequences of having
a Commissioner with merely illusory powers.
One prominent feature of Organized Baseball which may readily face
destruction is its prized exemption from federal antitrust laws. 73 The
United States Senate, upon the news of the Commissioner's departure,
reacted almost instantly with alarm. 74 A bipartisan group of senators
from the Senate Judiciary Committee, because it felt the ouster of Vincent
signaled that baseball owners were abusing the industry, decided to conduct
extensive hearings. 7 Since the antitrust exemption was granted to
baseball largely because of the assurance that the sport would not be
monopolized or mismanaged like other industries, the need for the
continued exemption was questionable.'76 Senator Howard Metzenbaum
commented: "It's big business, very big business, and holds many players
in human bondage. Baseball plays the same kind of hardball as those in
170. Id. at 299.
171. Chass, supra note 6, at B7.
172. Claire Smith, Coming Eventually: A New Commissioner, N.Y. TIMWS, Dec. 19, 1992,
§ 1, at 34.
173. Antitrust acts are designed for the purpose of preventing industries from unlawful
restraints, monopolies, and price fixing. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 94 (3d ed. 1990).
174. Charley Roberts, Senate Panel To Question Baseball's Antitrust Status, L.A. DAILY J.,
Sept. 11, 1992, at 1. Interestingly, the alliance of senators in favor of revoking the antitrust
exemption is very bipartisan in nature, including its most outspoken advocates: Democrats
Howard Metzenbaum (Ohio) and Bob Graham (Florida) and Republican Connie Mack (Florida).
Alison Muscatine, Senators Put Complaints On Record, WASH. PoST, Dec. 11, 1992, at F8.
175. Roberts, supra note 174, at 1. See also Alison Muscatine, Baseball, Congress Not
Exempt From Conflict, WASH. POST., Jan. 4, 1992, at D2.
176. Roberts, supra note 174, at 1.
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other businesses, so what makes baseball so unique?"'" The Senate also
seems concerned about the effects of recent events on the public trust in the
integrity of baseball-a concern expressed by Senator Patrick Leahy, who
stated the revocation of the exemption "would strike a responsive chord in
this country.
178
The Senate hearings were conducted in December 1992, with witnesses
including Fay Vincent and interim head of Baseball's Executive Committee,
Bud Selig. 7 9 The senators berated club owners for the mismanagement
of the sport.8 Their concern was legitimately bolstered by the fact that
since the interim period began, the owners have acted questionably by
backing out of a contract with St. Petersburg, Florida, concerning the Giants
baseball team.' Moreover, they failed to take prompt disciplinary action
in regards to allegedly racist comments made by Cincinnati Reds team
owner Marge Schott. 8 1 The former Commissioner testified before the
Senate that had he, or someone with equal authority, been in power at the
time, the disciplinary process could have been swiftly invoked against
Schott.' 3
The inability of the baseball industry to manage these continuing issues
could weigh heavily with the Senate. The result may be the removal of the
exemption and the application of federal antitrust laws to baseball in order
177. Jerome Holtzman, Baseball Hit Hard On the Hill, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1992, Sports, at
1.
178. Roberts, supra note 174, at 1. Only a handful of senators actively advocated continuing
the antitrust exemption. They were newly-elected Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator-elect
Barbara Boxer, both California Democrats. Holtzman, supra note 177, at 1. However, their
reasoning stemmed primarily from the fact that the city of San Francisco, California, will benefit
economically from the Giants' inability to relocate to St Petersburg, Florida. Stripping baseball
of the antitrust exemption would allow such relocations to proceed with a greater degree of
success. Id.
179. Muscatine, supra note 174, at F8.
180. Claire Smith, Baseball Executives Are Taken To Task, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 11, 1992, atB9.
181. Mike Dodd, Antitrust Status Likely To Hold Up, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 25, 1992, at 7C.
182. Muscatine, supra note 175, at D2.
183. Id. Disciplinary action was eventually implemented by the interim governing board of
Organized Baseball. On February 4, 1993, the Executive Committee suspended Schott from
baseball for the period of one year, and fined her $25,000. Mark Maske, Baseball Suspends
Schott One Year For Racial Slurs, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1993, at Al. However, this discipline
comes months after the incident; moreover, as one reporter has described it, Schott will still be
able to attend the Reds' home games as long as she sits in the upper deck of the executive suites,
and the fine amount roughly equals the profit margin on "five innings worth of beer sales in
Riverfront Stadium." Thomas Boswell, Crime and No Punishment, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1993,
at D1.
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to regulate its activities to the same extent that other major league sports
and interstate corporations are regulated.
If the antitrust exemption is stripped from Major League baseball, the
entire way the sport operates will need to be revamped."s This is a fate
that many legal scholars and legislators feel is long overdue,"8 5 given the
changes since the exemption was first upheld in 1922. Baseball has long
since crossed state borders, and now stands as an anomaly and aberration
when compared to the football, basketball, and hockey leagues.1 16 Most
find that there is no philosophical or practical reason for the exemption, but
rather explain its continued existence by the fact that the game stands alone
as a "national pastime.""8  One commentator has stated that the exemp-
tion is "anachronistic, upholding a privileged status for a single, small
group of wealthy sportsmen, founded on no substantive logic except
tradition-[and] has been an example of both stare decisis carried too far
and of narrow commercial interests and sentiments overthrowing the
requisites of judicial objectivity." ' Indeed, from a business perspective,
there is really nothing different between baseball and any other major
league sport.
Of course, both the United States Supreme Court and the Senate have
previously reviewed the antitrust exemption, and despite philosophical
misgivings, have never revoked it."89 But even if the Senate does not
revoke the exemption itself, the exemption will remain in danger of being
removed pending a court battle. Presently the most likely plaintiff is the
city of St. Petersburg, which could bring a breach of contract claim against
Major League baseball."9
Additionally, traditional problems associated with baseball governance
may augment any antitrust problems. Pressing issues which might stir
dissention include salary caps for players and revenue sharing on television
deals between the teams. 91 These issues may prove quite problematic for
the owners to solve on their own. One owner, when asked about the ability
184. Roberts, supra note 174, at 1.
185. Muscatine, supra note 175, at D2.
186. Roberts, supra note 174, at 1.
187. Muscatine, supra note 175, at D2 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has intimated that
there is no longer any basis for [the antitrust exemption] but has been unwilling to overturn the
[precedent], leaving the issue for Congress").
188. Berger, supra note 94, at 209.
189. Muscatine, supra note 175, at D2.
190. Dodd, supra note 181, at 7C.
191. Jason Stark, Vincent's Departure May Spark Diamond Revolution, CALGARY HERALD,
Sept. 11, 1992, atD5.
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of the owners who ousted Vincent will remain solidified in solving other
issues, remarked: "Until the next vote. The coalition has too many
inconsistencies."192
V. CONCLUSION
Baseball owners need to heed warnings about the sport's possible
future, or the era of the Commissioner's office may become a relic of the
past. If recent remarks about merely reviewing the position rather than
restructuring it are true, 93 the owners may be starting to take note.
Although the Vincent case has been vacated, it has damaged the scope of
the Commissioner's authority indefinitely. The decision allowed disgrun-
tied team owners the opportunity to force an elected Commissioner out of
office before the expiration of his term. An embattled Fay Vincent
resigned from his office due to the result in Vincent case.
The judge rejected over seventy years of clear precedent as to the
scope of the Commissioner's authority. Furthermore, the twenty year
interim between 1944 and 1964, when the powers of the office fell into
virtual disuse, stands as a poignant reminder of how important it is to the
sport's welfare and image to have a strong commissioner. The effect of
baseball's past acquiescence to the Commissioner has likewise been
undermined by the decision, even though such acquiescence says much
about how the power figures involved in the industry have always related.
The court has also passed over the opportunity to reach a viable
method of balancing the welfare of baseball itself against the welfare of
businesses which rely on it and exploit it to some extent. The question
remains open as to how far the cable television industry, and other
businesses that control or influence major league teams, may go in effecting
how baseball is managed. Consequently, this lack of clarification will be
inviting to many business interests which are not necessarily parallel to, and
perhaps in complete opposition to, the public's confidence and interest in
preserving an honorable national pastime.
The league owners are now in the process of reformulating the
Commissioner's office, and in so doing, appear to be planning a structure
for the future of baseball which will depart from the experience of the last
seventy years. While the judge's decision in this case is somewhat
192. Murray Chass, Anti-Vincent Ownership Is Facing Follow-Through, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 1992, at B7.
193. Smith, supra note 180, at B9.
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problematic, it is merely a symptom of problems that must be resolved
between how the Commissioner's office and league owners relate.
This will prove to be no small challenge, especially as the owners
attempt to avoid a multitude of possible problems, including the possibility
of losing the federal antitrust exemption. Since that privilege already rests
on precarious ground, the owners will be hard-pressed to find a workable
solution to this problem. How an organization as huge as Major League
baseball, which has relied on the extensive power of the Commissioner for
so long, will effectively function without it remains to be seen.
The league owners may find that they are walking a tightrope between
grasping control of the sport and ensuring that it continues to be managed
in an economically suitable manner. They will have to reach resolutions,
something which may be hard to accomplish when they have not had the
opportunity. They may soon find, as the courts have, that the concepts of
insuring the "morale of players" and the "honor of the game" are not
necessarily goals that can be easily reached. They have destroyed the very
instrument which was designed to handle the difficult decisions that are
connected to those overriding concerns.
Craig S. Pedersen*
* This Comment is dedicated in memory of Albert W. Christensen, who loved baseball, and
Priscilla Christensen, who loved to see justice done. The author would like to thank the following
people: his dad, whose love and support made law school a reality; his mom, for her love, and
for being the first to introduce him to the beauty of the written word; editors Greg Schenz, Debra
Klevatt, and John Gehart, for their assistance and commitment; and Kurt, Jane, Kelly, James, and
Dominique, each of whom should know why.
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